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TAXATION OF PROFESSIONAL PENSION PLANS
One of the inequalities of present day federal taxation is that self-employed
professional men do not qualify for many pension plan advantages en]oyed by
their economic counterparts, the executives and shareholder employees of cor-
porations. Sections 401-404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 give many
pension plan benefits' to those who can qualify as employees if their corporate
employer has established an approved pension plan. Non-professional self-em-
ployed persons can establish the employer-employee relationship needed to set
up an approved pension plan by incorporation of their business. This relationship
and its tax advantages would seem to be lost to the self-employed professional
man, who is often denied by state statute the right to incorporate for the practice
of his profession 2
The best solution to the inequality of the tax treatment of pension plans would
be to allow professional self-employed the benefits of sections 401-404. This
simple step would completely eliminate the necessity of taking the trip to cor-
porate employee status. Bills were introduced in the last session of Congress3
to amend section 7701(a) of the Internal Revenue Code to accomplish tins result,
by amending the definitions of "person," "corporation," "stock," and "share-
holder" to embrace professional corporations and associations formed under state
law. The attempt was unsuccessful.
The purpose of fis note is to examine the tvo roads by which a self-em-
ployed professional man can arrive at the federal tax classification of employee.
The starting point is to find or create an employer who is capable of establishing
an approved pension plan. The most obvious candidate for this position is the
corporation. For those denied the right to incorporate, there is the unincorporated
association that is taxed as a corporation. However, a map pointing the way to
employee status that shows two roads, incorporation or association, without show-
ing the detours and roadblocks, is unfortunately too simplified. But neither road
leads to a dead end. The federal courts have established road signs pointing to
the increasingly desired classification of employee.
One detour is the Self-Employed Persons Retirement Act of 1962,4 com-
monly called "H.R. 10." This is an attempt to correct the tax inequality by
establishing a separate set of rules for the pension plans of the self-employed. It
has achieved partial success. If it provided benefits equal to those available to
corporate employees, H.R. 10 would eliminate the necessity of taling the trip
to corporate employee status.
It is beyond the scope of fis note to discuss the provisions of H.R. 10. Suffice
it to say that those covered by it are denied many benefits available to corporate
employees. A comparison of the benefits of H.R. 10 and those available to em-
1 Two of the more important benefits are that the employee is not taxed for the
money placed in the plan until it is actually received by him, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 402, and that the accumulated earnings of the fund are exempt from income tax
until distribution, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401, 501.2 See Anderson, Tax Aspects of Professtonal Corporations, 1963 SouTnEnN CAL.
TAx INsTrrur 309, 311. See generally id. at 309-36.
3S. 2403, H.R. 9217, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
476 Stat. 809, wlch amends INT. BRv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-405.
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ployees under sections 401-404 has been made in several articles. 5 The conclu-
sion generally reached is -that the act completely falls short of its pre-enactment
billing.6 It does not give self-employed persons access to retirement plans on a
reasonably similar basis to that accorded corporate stockholder employees.' The
best -thing that can be said about the act is that it may be amended m the future
to provide greater benefits.8
H.R. 10 can be an acceptable alternative to attainment of employee status.
Some professional men will find in their particular financial situations that the
disadvantages of corporate taxation more than outweigh the retirement plan bene-
fits. Taxation as a corporation involves many more considerations than a mere
calculation of retirement plan benefits.9 For this group, H.R. 10, as limited as
its benefits might be, it better than no plan at all.
Problems of professional ethics, particularly concern over the destruction of
the client-professional man relationship by the interposition of a corporation or
association, might convince many unimpressed with the financial advantages of
H.R. 10 that it is their best alternative. It allows them to continue to work in the
traditional partnership form or as individuals. The ever present possibility of -tax
reform in the corporate taxation field is an additional factor that will convince
some to provide for their retirement under the provisions of -this act rather than
attempt formation of a corporation or association.
Even after considering all the above factors, many persons are still not
satisfied with the Self-Employed Persons Retirement Act..They do not wish their
only other hope for tax relief to be a possible reform of the Internal Revenue
Code. These professional men should examine more closely the two roads to the
tax status of corporate employee.
In the last four years many states have passed statutes that attempt to erase
the tax inequality by modifying the prior state law concerning professions. The
purpose of these modifications is to allow the professional man to qualify for
employee status by providing him with an opportunity to organize a professional
corporation, or a professional association that qualifies for taxation as a corpora-
tion. These statutes were passed in response to the invitation held out by the
Internal Revenue Service regulations of 1960, the "Kintner regulations," which
placed a great deal of emphasis on the -legal relationships possible under state
law.' 0 Changes in state law would seem to be one adequate solution to the
5 Grayck, Self-Employed Retirement Plans, 63 COLum. L. Rlv. 415 (1963); Snyder
& Weckstem, Professional Corporations, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613 (1963); Forster, De-
ferred Compensation Plans for Lawyers and Law Offices, 1964 Sou mmi CAL. TAX
INsTrruTE 393.
6 H.R. REP. No. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
7 Grayck, supra note 5, at 432.
8 S. 2229, H.R. 8771, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), was a recently offered amend-
ment that was not reported out of committee.
9 For an analysis of the tax problems involved in the establishment and operation
of a professional association or corporation (for example, possible double taxation on
dividends paid to the stockholders) see Snyder & Weckstem, supra note 5, at 634.
'
0 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960) provides that although it is the Internal
Revenue Code rather than local law which establishes the tests or standards which will
be applied in determining the classification in which an organization belongs, local
law governs in determining whether the legal relationships which have been established
in the formation of an organization are such that the standards are met.
[VOL 16
problem but for the 1965 amendments to the Internal Revenue Service Regula-
tions." These amendments attempt to destroy completely the effect of the recent
state statutes. The regulations and amendments will be discussed in detail below.
Taxation of an unincorporated association as a corporation is based on the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 7701(a) (3), which states that "the
term corporation includes associations .... " The term association is undefined in
the code; however, there is a long line of cases providing a definition. The early
case of Hecht v. Malley12 established that an association does not have to be a
corporation created under the laws of a state to be taxable as a corporation.
Morrissey v. Commissioner'3 and three companion cases' 4 established criteria
for determining whether a particular association is taxable as a corporation. The
association that is taxed as a corporation is one that can pass the test of corporate
resemblance. The test requires a consideration of four factors: centralized control,
continuity, limited personal liability, and transferability of beneficial interests. 15
This test, as applied by the courts, is not rigid, but is flexible enough to take into
account all possible fact variations in the substance and form of the particular
association under consideration. The test has been applied to a marketing arrange-
ment,16 an investment arrangement, 17 a professional clinic operating under a
trust,'8 a commodity trading partnership, 19 and professional association,2 0 to
name but a few. It requires consideration of each case as a special, separate
problem.21 "The inclusion of associations with corporations implies resemblance,
but it is resemblance and not identity."2 2 If the association has more corporate
than non-corporate characteristics, based on a consideration of the four factors,
it will be taxed as a corporation.
There is a large group of decisions that support taxation of varying types of
associations as corporations. The test of corporate resemblance has been applied
to professional groups in four federal cases.23 In all four cases, the unincorporated
professional group has been found to be properly taxed as a corporation. Thus,
there should seemingly be no difficulty if self-employed professional men wish to
1 T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. R v. BuLL. No. 9, at 38.
12265 U.S. 144 (1924).
13296 U.S. 344 (1935).
34 Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935); Helvering v.
Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935).
15 Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 1963). After stating that
the lower federal courts have not universally agreed about the elements of the resem-
blance test as set forth in Morrissey, the court concludes that there is substantial agree-
ment that the four critical elements are those listed in the text.
16 John Province #1 Well v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1963).
17 United States v. Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961).
18 Peltork v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1936).
39 Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1963).
20 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Foreman v. United
States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360
(N.D. Tex. 1959).
21United States v. Davidson, 115 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1940).
22 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935).
23 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Pelton v. Commis-
sioner, 82 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1936); Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134
(S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
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form an unincorporated association that qualifies for federal taxation as a corpora-
tion. But there is presently a great deal of difficulty.
The roadblock with which the self-employed professional man has to contend
is the adamant opposition of the Internal Revenue Service. The Service is pres-
ently opposed to self-employed professional men attaining employee status,
whether they travel the road of incorporation or the road of association. This
is inconsistent with the Service's former position. In 1936, in the first case in-
volving a professional group,24 the Service argued successfully that an unincor-
porated clinic of doctors, operating and organized under a trust indenture,
should be taxed as a corporation. But the subsequent rise in income tax rates and
the establishment of the pension plan benefits available to corporate employees
made the tax classification of employee more financially advantageous to the
taxpayer than it was in 1936. Thus the Service is found in court in 1954,25
1959,26 and 1964,27 arguing that unincorporated associations of doctors, organized
and operating under articles of association, should not be taxed as corporations.
There was nothing in the difference between the organization and operation under
the trust indenture in the 1936 case and that under the articles of association in
the three later cases that warranted the change of position by the Service. The
statutory definition of "corporation" remained unchanged.28 The change of posi-
tion is explainable only by a policy of collecting the maximum number of tax
dollars.
At present, the Internal Revenue Service appears dedicated to maintaining
a roadblock against professional men attaining employee tax status. The core of
the roadblock is opposition in court. The outer layer is the promulgation of regula-
tions which deny that there is a way to achieve this status. Before examining the
arguments used in court by the Service and the regulations, let us examine how
the four provisions of the corporate resemblance test were applied to the fact
situations in the four cases involving professional associations.
The doctors in the case of Pelton v. Commissioner29 sought unsuccessfully to
avoid being taxed as a corporation. Pursuant to the terms of the trust indenture,
the trustees exercised centralized control of the operation of the clinic. The criteria
of transferability of beneficial interests and continuity were satisfied by shares
which were transferable, subject to an option to purchase held by the remaining
beneficiaries, even though the trust was to last only ten years. The court did not
discuss the question of limited liability, concluding that it was clear that all the
substantial points of resemblance to a corporation were present.
The Kintner3" case is the only decision rendered by a federal appellate court
passing on the tax classification of a professional unincorporated association
24 Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1936).
25 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
26 Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
27 Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
28Th Pelton decision is based on the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 2(a) (2),
43 Stat. 253, and the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 2(a) (2), 44 Stat. 9. Kintner is
based on Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 3797(a) (3), 53 Stat. 469. Galt and Foreman
are based ork INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (3). All sections provide that the
term "corporation" includes associations.
2982 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1936).
30 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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organized with articles of association and intended by its organizers to be taxed as
a corporation. The articles provided for centralized control, transferability of in-
terests, and continuity. Even though there was no limitation on the personal
liability of the members for professional misconduct, the association was held to
be a corporation for federal tax purposes, rather than a partnership.
The court in Galts l views the question as one of elementary justice and cites
no authority for its finding that the clinic was an association taxable as a corpora-
tion. The articles of association covered in substance all things that would have
been covered by articles of incorporation had incorporation been permitted by
the laws of the state. The fact that it was not permitted was no ground for a
different tax treatment of the association when the relationship among the mem-
bers and to the public was similar to that of a corporation.
The most recent case is Foreman v. United States.32 Here, the association
acquired all of the assets of a former partnership, and the former partners now
considered themselves employees. The important provisions of the articles of as-
sociation followed closely the form and substance of typical articles of incorpora-
tion. The court also looked at the actual operation of the association. Centralized
control was found to be exercised since the Board of Governors determined
salary, hours, working conditions and vacations. No fees were retained by the
individual doctors. One doctor had the sole power to make purchases and bind
the association by contract. The court held that the association met the first three
criteria of the Morrissey case more closely than did the Kintner or Galt associa-
tions. The fourth criterion, limited liability, was not met; the court said that
neither the Kintner nor Galt associations met this criterion. Nonetheless, the as-
sociation was held properly taxed as a corporation.
The Internal Revenue Service has used three different arguments in each of the
last three cases to attempt to convince the court that the association should not
be taxed as a corporation. The first is that a professional association can never have
the requisite substantial resemblance to a corporation if members of the profession
cannot incorporate. This argument was expressly rejected, the court saying:
[Ilt would introduce an anarchic element in federal taxation if we determined
the nature of associations by state criteria rather than by special criteria sanc-
tioned by the tax law ... . It would destroy the uniformity so essential to a
federal tax system - a uniformity which calls for equal treatment of taxpayers,
no matter in what state their activities are carried on.m
The second contention is that the decision in Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Com-
missioner34 is controlling in cases involving professional associations. In this case
the association was held not to be taxable as a corporation. But the case was
easily distinguished 5 on the basis of the limited functions of the Bar Pilots As-
sociation (it was a mere agent).
The third contention is that the income earned by a professional association,
being from personal services, is not the type of income a normal corporation
31 Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
32Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
3Foreman v. United States, supra note 32, at 136, quoting United States v.
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
34 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938).
S5 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1954).
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earns. This contention, though true, is meaningless. There are many corporations
whose corporate tax status is not altered by the fact that they derive their pri-
mary income from personal services, such as advertising, promotion, and sales.
This analogy was used by the court in rejecting the contention. 6
The Internal Revenue Service has not accepted the precedents of the cases it
has lost. Its opposition in court, though unsuccessful there, has been effective in
deterring the formation of more professional associations. This is because it will re-
quire litigation to establish corporate tax status.
The other aspect of the roadblock erected by -the Internal Revenue Service is
the deterrent effect of its regulations. Revenue Ruling 23s7 was issued several
months after the decision in Kintner. It stated that the decision in that case would
not be accepted as a precedent for disposition of similar fact situations. But in
1960 final regulations were issued pursuant to section 7701 (a) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.38 These regulations accepted the Kintner case holding.
The presence of the four characteristics of the corporate resemblance test was to
be determined by the relationships permissible under state law. This regulation
led to the enactment of the state professional incorporation statutes mentioned
earlier in this note. But professional men were not given a chance to use these
regulations to qualify for employee status. Soon the taxpayer was required to
obtain a determination that the group was taxable as a corporation and that an
employment relationship existed between the association and its officers and em-
ployees.3 9 The Internal Revenue Service treated this requirement as applicable
both to professional associations and professional corporations. Very few deter-
minations have been issued, though requests for many were received.40
On December 17, 1963, new proposed amendments to the Kintner regulations
were issued.4 ' On February 2, 1965, these proposals were adopted.42 With the
exception of deleting Example (1) to § 301.7701-2(g), the amendments leave
the Kintner regulations of 1960 intact, but add two new paragraphs. These para-
graphs are intended to be fatal to professional associations and corporations, re-
ferred to as "professional service organ'izations."43 The amendments attempt to
show how a "professional service organization" can never pass -the test of corporate
resemblance and thus cannot qualify for taxation as a corporation.
36 Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S..D. Fla. 1964).
37 1956-1 Ctm. BuLL. 598.
8 Treas. Reg. § 310.7701-1 to -11 (1960).
39 REV. Pnoc. 61-11, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 897.
4 0 Eber, Professional Service Corporations, 103 ThusTs & EsTATEs 420 (1964).
41Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(d), 28 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1963); Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), 28 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1963).
42 T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. RFv. BULL. No. 9, at 38.43 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(h) (1965) defines a professional service organization as
an organization formed by one or more persons to engage in a business involving the
performance of professional services for profit which, under local law, may not be
organized and operated in the form of an ordinary business corporation having the
usual characteristics of such an organization. Even if a professional service organization
is organized as an ordinary business corporation, the amendment applies if such cor-
poration is subject to local regulatory rules which deprive such corporation of the
usual characteristics of an ordinary business corporation, and whether it is labeled a
professional service corporation, professional service association, a trust, or otherwise.
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The theory of the amendments that these organizations cannot pass the test
appears unlikely to be upheld by the courts. Example (1) of the Kintner
regulations is omitted because the conclusion of the example that the association
described is taxable as a corporation would not be valid, according to the new
amendments. Example (1) has been thought to be a description of either
Galt or Kintner.44 Deleting the example would, of course, not alter the hold-
ing of either case. The test of corporate resemblance, as applied to professional as-
sociations, has been interpreted by the courts in the four cases previously dis-
cussed. These decisions show, contrary to the theory of the amendments, that it
is possible for a professional association to pass the test of corporate resem-
blance.
To summarize the present status of the regulations is difficult. We still have
the 1960 "Kintner" regulations that apply to all associations. The two new para-
graphs attempt to show that a professional service organization cannot meet the
requirements of the corporate resemblance test as it is defined in the 1960 regu-
lations. Even analyzing the test of corporate resemblance as interpreted by the reg-
ulations of 1960, which are still unchanged, the amendments do not appear to
logically reach the conclusion that a professional service organization cannot pass
the test.
The first criterion listed is continuity of life. "An organization has continuity
of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion of
any member will not cause a dissolution of the organization." 45 Dissolution is de-
fined -to mean an alteration of identity of an organization by reason of a change
in the relationship between the members as determined under local law. The
amendments deny that a professional service organization can have the continuity
of life possessed by an ordinary business corporation, because the continuing
existence of the organization depends upon the willingness of its remaining mem-
bers (after -the termination of -the employment relationship of a member) to
agree either by prior arrangement or at the time of such termination to acquire
his interest or to employ his proposed successor. The amendments ignore those
provisions of the recent local laws which commonly have provided for the con-
tinuance of the organization after the termination of the employment of a mem-
ber. Failure of the remaining members to acquire the interest of the member
whose employment relationship terminates would not automatically result in a
dissolution of the organization. The continuity of life criterion should be satisfied
if the organization would not be dissolved by those events which would normally
terminate a partnership.
An organization has centralization of management if any person or group of
persons (which does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive
authority to make the necessary management decision.46 These decisions must not
require ratification by the members. The recent amendments say that there is no
centralization of management in a professional service organization if a profes-
sional member retains professional responsibility for the handling of a particular
44 Goldberg, Professional Corporations-Current Status, 19 Bus. LAw. 707, 718
(1964).
45 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
46 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1960).
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case. 47 This ignores the fact that all professionals must adhere to the same profes-
sional standards, whether practising as employees of an ordinary business corpora-
tion or as employees of a professional service organization. Centralization of man-
agement can exist in the latter as well as the former situation. Even the ordinary
business corporation must delegate some decision-making authority to certain
of its employees.
"An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if under
local law there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims
against the organization." 48 Most of the recent state statutes provide for such a
limitation of liability for professional service organization. 49 However, the amend-
ments find limited liability in a professional service organization only if the per-
sonal liability of each of the members is no greater in any respect than that of
shareholder-employees of an ordinary business corporation. This implies that there
can be no limitation of liability in a professional service organization, because of
personal liability to clients or patients. But if it is remembered that the nature.
of the liability of employees, professional or not, is the same--that is, all employees
are personally liable for their own torts-it would seem that a professional
service organization can possess the corporate characteristic of limited lia-
bility.5 0
The final corporate characteristic to be considered is free transferability of
interests. The member must be able to confer upon his substitute all the attributes
of his interest in the organization. The 1960 regulations also provide for a modi-
fied form of free transferability of interest, if a member can transfer his interest
only after having offered it to the other members at its fair market value.5 1 The
amendment concludes that the corporate characteristic of free transferability
of interests does not exist if the interest of a member consists of a right to share
in the profits of the organization which is contingent upon and inseparable from
his continuing employment, and the other members have a right of "first re-
fusal" (an option to purchase the member's share). Free transferability would
exist only if the member, without the consent of the other members, could trans-
fer both his right to share in the profits of the organization and the right to an
employment relationship with the organization. The amendments refuse to grant
to a professional service organization the right to a modified form of free trans-
ferability that the 1960 regulations appear to give to all associations.
47 This view is contrary to a previous ruling of the Internal Revenue Service
under the 1960 regulations that in the case of professional employees a greater degree
of discretion in the performance of professional duties exists and is consistent with the
employment relationship. The Colony Medical Group, Special Ruling, CCH 1961
STA D. FED. TAx REP. § 6375.
48 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1) (1960).
49 Goldberg, supra note 44, at 716.
50 The court in Foreman said that neither the Kintner, Galt, nor Foreman associa-
tions possessed the corporate characteristic of limited liability. Because the test of
corporate resemblance requires only more corporate'than non-corporate characteristics,
this failure did not prevent the associations from being taxed as corporations. Most
state statutes passed since 1960 either expressly provide for limited liability or provide
that the general corporation statute of the state providing for limited liability for share-
holders is applicable to the members of the professional service organization.
51 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960).
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In addition to the conflict between the conclusions of the amendments and
those of the regulations, the amendments conflict with the cases which hold that
professional asociations can pass the test of corporate resemblance. There are two
additional objections to the new, amendments. First, they require that a pro-
fessional service organization be identical to the "ordinary business corporation"
and not merely to corporations in general. Second, they forget that the test of
corporate resemblance is one of resemblance only, not of identity.
2
Public interest was immediately aroused by the attempt to nullify court deci-
sions and recent state legislation. At the hearing on the amendments (held while
they were still only proposals) more than 90 groups and individuals were heard,
and more than 500 comments were filed. No other proposed amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code regulations have ever caused such a response.
58 It was
obviously to no avail.
The amendments should be rescinded or modified. They continue to reflect
the past policy of placing a roadblock in the path of professional men who at-
tempt to achieve employee status, even though the Internal Revenue Service has
yet to win a case on the point. This policy has been described as attempting "to
change existing law by administrative fiat."54 It probably has been effective in
preventing many professional men from even attempting to achieve employee tax
status.
What chance do professional men, facing opposition of the Internal Revenue
Service, have to achieve tax equality? Legislation or litigation appear to be the
only two possibilities. The failure of attempted reforms and the legislative his-
tory of the Self-Employed Persons Retirement Act5 5 indicate that legislation,
though always a possibility, is not a very promising one. For those professional
men who are reluctant to lose money each year that they are taxed under their
present classification, litigation appears to be the only answer.
There is a strong general feeling that it is unprofessional and foolhardy to in-
vite litigation. It is not good long-range tax planning to base the formation and
operation of an organization on premises which can be established only by over-
turning the regulations of the Internal Revenue Service. Even so, several
writers, apparently tired of administrative beating around the bush, advise that
the Internal Revenue Service can be fought successfully in court.
56 They feel
that the opposition of the Internal Revenue Service should not prevent formation
of a professional organization, either corporation or association, in situations where
it is authorized by local law, and that the immediate tax saving, both to employer
and employee, greatly outweighs the expense of litigation. This opinion is sup-
52 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
5 Goldberg, supra note 44, at 719.
54Eaton & Maycock, Professional Corporations, 20 J. TAXATION 150 (1964).
55 A self-employed persons retirement bill was introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives in 1951, 1953, 1954, and 1957. A bill was passed by the House every
year from 1958 to 1961, but no final passage through Congress was achieved until
1962.
5 6E.g., Eaton & Maycock, supra note 54, at 153; Eber, supra note 40. Mr. Eber
was one of the architects of the corporation and accounting procedures used success-
fully by the association in Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla.
1964).
May. 1965] NOTES
